Agenda item

(A report by Christian Allen, Service Director – Regulatory)

The Chairman introduced the item and welcomed representatives of the relevant Risk Management Authorities to the meeting.

 

The Service Director – Regulatory, at the invitation of the Chairman, presented the report and provided a detailed introduction to the matter before the Committee. Members were reminded that the item related to the flooding event of 6^th January 2025, which resulted in internal flooding to 38 residential properties within the Wyberton West Road and Park Road areas of Boston.

 

The Service Director – Regulatory explained that, in accordance with the requirements of the Flood and Water Management Act 2010, Lincolnshire County Council, in its capacity as Lead Local Flood Authority, had undertaken a Section 19 flood investigation to establish the causes of the event and identify the relevant Risk Management Authorities. The final Section 19 Flood Investigation Report (S19?941, dated 30 July 2025) was attached to the agenda as Appendix A.

 

It was further outlined that the Section 19 report had previously been considered by the Committee, at which time Members had resolved to invite representatives of the Risk Management Authorities to attend a future meeting to provide an update on how the recommendations arising from the investigation, as set out within Appendix A, had been addressed or were intended to be progressed. The purpose of the item was therefore to enable the Committee to scrutinise the actions taken to date and to consider whether further steps were required.

 

Following the introduction of the report, the Chairman invited the representatives of the Risk Management Authorities to present to the Committee.

 

The Flood and Water Manager from Lincolnshire County Council, in the capacity of Lead Local Flood Authority, provided an overview of the statutory framework governing Section 19 investigations. It was explained that such investigations were undertaken to establish the causes of flooding events affecting internal property flooding and to identify those organisations with relevant flood risk management responsibilities. The Committee was advised that, whilst the process allowed for recommendations to be made, there were no statutory powers to compel delivery, and therefore implementation relied on partnership working between the relevant authorities.

 

The Committee were informed of the increasing scale and frequency of flood events across Lincolnshire in recent years, noting that a significant number of properties had been impacted by flooding across multiple events. It was emphasised that, although flood water often receded quickly, the longer-term impacts on affected residents could be substantial and enduring. The presentation also highlighted the criteria for undertaking Section 19 investigations, with particular emphasis on internal flooding as the primary trigger for a formal investigation.

 

In relation to the event of January 2025, it was confirmed that the investigation, as set out within Appendix A, had identified a combination of contributing factors, including extreme rainfall, saturated and frozen ground conditions, rapid runoff from the wider catchment, and elevated tidal levels, which together resulted in increased pressure within the South Forty Foot Drain, leading to overtopping at known low points along the flood defence system, which was identified as the principal mechanism for the flooding experienced within the affected residential areas.

 

The Area Flood Risk Manager from the Environment Agency then addressed the Committee and outlined the organisation’s responsibilities for managing flood risk from main rivers and the sea. It was explained that the Environment Agency also had responsibility for the operation of flood warning systems and the development of long-term investment programmes aimed at reducing flood risk.

 

In response to the recommendations within the Section 19 report (Appendix A), the Committee was advised that a new, localised fluvial flood warning area had been established for the affected community following the January 2025 event. This was intended to ensure that residents would receive more targeted and timely warnings in the event of future flooding. It was noted that the development of such warning areas required detailed technical assessment, including establishing appropriate trigger levels, to ensure both accuracy and reliability.

 

The Committee were also informed that a review of hydraulic modelling for the South Forty Foot Drain had been undertaken following the event. The updated modelling had broadly confirmed the assumptions and outputs of earlier modelling work, although it was acknowledged that additional refinement work may be undertaken as part of ongoing investigations. It was further reported that funding had been secured for the 2026/27 financial year to undertake more detailed investigation into flood defences within the Boston area, including assessment of embankment condition, wall integrity, and potential issues relating to settlement and seepage, as identified within Appendix A.

 

The Chief Executive of the Black Sluice Internal Drainage Board then provided an update in respect of operational arrangements within the wider drainage network. The Committee was advised that significant improvements had been made to the management of pumping stations since earlier flood events, including the introduction of enhanced telemetry systems which allowed for remote operation and more rapid implementation of emergency pumping profiles.

 

It was explained that, whereas manual intervention had previously been required across multiple sites, the new system allowed for a more coordinated and responsive approach to managing water levels across the catchment during extreme conditions. It was further outlined that the drainage network within the catchment remained highly complex, with many pumping stations and interconnected watercourses. As such, management of water levels required a balance between protecting downstream areas, including Boston, and avoiding adverse impacts within upstream catchments. Ongoing discussions between partner organisations were reported to be taking place to explore improvements to system integration and operational response during future events.

 

The Committee then received a briefing from the Emergency Planning and Business Continuity Officer and the Community Resilience Officer, from the Lincolnshire Fire & Rescue Emergency Planning & Business Continuity Service, who outlined the work being undertaken to support community preparedness and recovery, in line with the recommendations set out within Appendix A. It was explained that a key focus had been placed on strengthening community resilience through the development of local emergency plans, the establishment of community response arrangements, and the provision of training and resources to support volunteers.

 

The Committee was advised that communities were encouraged to take an active role in planning for future flooding events, including identifying local places of safety, coordinating volunteer support, and establishing communication channels to ensure information could be shared effectively during emergencies. It was emphasised that this work was intended to complement, rather than replace, the role of the emergency services, by enabling communities to act more quickly and effectively in the immediate stages of an incident.

 

In concluding the presentations, it was emphasised that a significant amount of work had been undertaken across all partner organisations since the January 2025 flooding event, and that further work remained ongoing to better understand the circumstances of the event and to identify opportunities to reduce flood risk in the future.

 

Following the conclusion of the presentations, the Chairman opened the meeting for questions and comments, and the Committee proceeded to undertake a detailed and wide-ranging discussion.

 

Attention was drawn to the condition of flood defence assets, particularly in relation to sections of the South Forty Foot Drain where overtopping had occurred. Members expressed concern that defects, including cracking and areas of weakness within the flood wall, had been identified prior to the January 2025 event and queried why more immediate remedial action had not been undertaken. Officers explained that whilst inspections had identified areas requiring attention, works were subject to established funding and prioritisation processes. Schemes were required to be developed and submitted through programmed bidding cycles, and as a result, there could be a delay between the identification of issues and the delivery of substantive works. It was further noted that, although some interim works had been completed, these had not been sufficient to mitigate the impacts of the event.

 

The Committee explored this matter further, expressing concern that such processes could leave communities exposed to risk where known issues remained unresolved. It was acknowledged that flood risk management involved many assets across a wide geographic area, and that decisions regarding investment were made based on relative risk and available resources. Members emphasised the importance of ensuring that identified vulnerabilities were addressed in a timely manner wherever possible.

 

The discussion then moved to the role of modelling and risk assessment, with Members seeking clarification on the reliance placed on historic hydraulic modelling. It was noted that modelling undertaken in 2016 had been used to inform earlier strategic decisions, and Members questioned whether such modelling remained sufficiently robust considering increasingly frequent and severe weather events. Officers confirmed that the modelling had been reviewed following the January 2025 event and was found to be broadly consistent with observed outcomes. However, it was also acknowledged that the event had been significantly influenced by specific catchment conditions, including frozen and saturated ground, which had resulted in rapid runoff and elevated water levels. The Committee recognised that whilst modelling remained an essential tool, it must continue to evolve alongside changing environmental conditions.

 

Consideration was then given to the flood warning arrangements in place at the time of the event. Members noted that there had been no specific fluvial flood warning for the affected area prior to January 2025 and questioned whether this represented a gap in provision. The Committee was advised that the existing warning system had been configured primarily to address tidal flood risk and that the need for a dedicated fluvial warning area had not previously been identified. It was confirmed that this had been rectified following the event through the introduction of a new, localised warning area.

 

The Committee also examined the operation and coordination of flood risk infrastructure, including pumping stations and sluice systems. Members sought to understand how these systems had functioned during the event and whether any limitations had contributed to the flooding experienced. It was explained that the event had been driven by a complex combination of factors, including high fluvial flows coinciding with tidal constraints, which had restricted the discharge of water from the system. Members were advised that improvements had since been made to operational arrangements, with further work ongoing to strengthen coordination and system responsiveness.

 

Members also considered the statutory framework governing flood risk management, particularly the limitations of the Section 19 process. It was acknowledged that recommendations arising from the report could not be enforced and that implementation depended upon the priorities and resources of the respective Risk Management Authorities. Members expressed concern regarding the potential implications of this and emphasised the importance of continued scrutiny in ensuring accountability.

 

Discussion also addressed the availability and uptake of property flood resilience measures. Members noted that take?up of the grant scheme had been relatively low and sought to understand the reasons for this. It was explained that, whilst eligible residents had been contacted directly, many had been focused on immediate recovery and insurance matters, which had impacted engagement.

 

Throughout the discussion, Members returned to the impact of the flooding on residents and the ongoing recovery process, recognising that the consequences had been long-lasting and significant, and that continued support and engagement remained essential.

 

The Committee received representations from members of the public who had been directly affected by the flooding event, together with contributions made by the local County Councillor.

 

The representations provided a detailed account of the experience of residents over the preceding 18 months and highlighted the significant and ongoing impact of the flooding on individuals and households. It was explained that, whilst the initial response to the incident had been swift and supportive, the longer-term recovery had proved considerably more challenging.

 

Concerns were raised regarding the availability and accessibility of information following the incident, in particular limited awareness of the Section 19 Flood Investigation Report and that communication regarding its findings had not been consistently received.

Residents further expressed concern regarding the condition and adequacy of flood defences identified, and highlighted the continued anxiety within the community during periods of heavy rainfall.

 

Notwithstanding these concerns, it was emphasised that residents wished to work constructively with partner organisations and expressed a clear desire for improved engagement, transparency and ongoing involvement in future planning.

 

The Committee also heard from the County Councillor, who raised concerns regarding coordination between Risk Management Authorities and elected representatives. It was indicated that communication with local Members had not always been consistent, and that improved information sharing was required to support councillors in representing their communities effectively.

 

Officers acknowledged the concerns raised by both residents and the County Councillor and recognised the need to improve communication, coordination and engagement moving forward.

 

In drawing the discussion to a close, the Chairman thanked the representatives of the Risk Management Authorities and members of the public for their contributions.

 

The Committee acknowledged the complexity of the flooding event and the significant impact on affected residents and emphasised the importance of ensuring that progress against the recommendations contained within the Section 19 report were actively monitored.

 

Resolved:

 

1.    That the report and the representations from the Risk Management Authorities received and be noted;

 

2.    That the comments and concerns raised during the meeting be formally recorded and shared with the relevant organisations;

 

3.    That a further update report be brought back to the Committee in six months’ time to provide assurance on progress against the recommendations contained within the Section 19 Flood Investigation Report; and

 

4.    That the matter remain subject to ongoing scrutiny.

 

[The Community Resilience Officer entered the meeting at 6.45pm, during consideration of the above item.]

 

[Councillor Neil Drayton left the room at 8.04pm and returned at 8.06pm, during consideration of the above item.]

 

[The Flood and Water Manager (Lincolnshire County Council), Area Flood Risk Manager (Environment Agency), Chief Executive (Black Sluice Internal Drainage Board), Emergency Planning and Business Continuity Officer, and Community Resilience Officer (Lincolnshire Fire & Rescue Emergency Planning and Business Continuity Service) and Councillor Peter Bedford left the meeting at 8.16pm.]

 

[At the conclusion of this item a brief adjournment was held at 8.16pm until 8.31pm.]